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Sammendrag 
Et vanlig fenomen som observeres på mange arbeidsmarkeder er at arbeidstilbudet ser ut til å avhenge 
av konjunktursvingninger. Individer som søker arbeid synes å bli motløse under ugunstige 
konjunktursituasjoner fordi de tror at deres sjanser til å finne en akseptabel jobb er så små at kostnader 
og stress knyttet til jobbsøking oppveier de forventede fordelene med å søke. De potensielle 
arbeiderne trekker seg dermed ut av arbeidsmarkedet. Innen vårt rammeverk er en kvinne som ikke 
jobber, definert som motløs hvis hun ønsker å søke etter arbeid under veldig gode konjunkturforhold, 
men har trukket seg fra arbeidsstyrken under de aktuelle forholdene.  
 
Vi studerer motløs arbeidereffekten separat for gifte/samboende kvinner født i ikke-vestlige land og i 
Norge med utgangspunkt i en modell basert på teorien for jobbsøking. Modellen spesifiserer hvordan 
sannsynligheten for å være i arbeidsstyrken avhenger av en parameter som representerer søkekostnad 
per tidsenhet samt sannsynligheten for å bli sysselsatt, gitt jobb søking. Modellen er konsistent med 
aktører (kvinner) som hver for seg kan avvike fra perfekt rasjonalitet når de vurderer verdien av 
jobbsøking, men som i gjennomsnitt tilfredsstiller restriksjoner som følger fra søketeori. Modellen 
benyttes til å analysere motløs arbeidereffekten separat for kvinnelige innvandrere og kvinner født i 
Norge ved hjelp av paneldata fra Arbeidskraftsundersøkelsene (AKU) for hvert kvartal fra andre 
kvartal 1988 til fjerde kvartal 2010.  
 
Vi finner at estimert søkekostnad per tidsenhet er betydelig høyere for kvinner født i Norge enn for 
innvandrerkvinner fra ikke-vestlige land. En innvandrerkvinne med samme sannsynlighet for å skaffe 
seg arbeid som en kvinne født i Norge vil dermed ha større sjanse for å søke arbeid enn en kvinne født 
i Norge. Andelen motløse arbeidere er imidlertid for de fleste grupper mye høyere for 
innvandrerkvinner enn for kvinner født i Norge. Årsaken er at estimert total (forventet) søkekostnad 
(søkekostnad ganger forventet søketid) i gjennomsnitt er høyere for innvandrerkvinner enn for kvinner 
født i Norge.  
 
Vi foreslår også et mål for ledighet som vi kaller modifisert arbeidsledighetsrate. Denne omfatter både 
registrerte arbeidsledige og motløse arbeidere. Eksempelvis er arbeidsledighetsraten for gifte eller 
samboende kvinner fra ikke-vestlige land om lag 17 prosent i 2005, mens den modifiserte 
arbeidsledighetsraten er om lag 25 prosent.  
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1. Introduction 
A common phenomenon observed in many labor markets is that the supply of labor appears to depend 
on business cycles fluctuations. Workers who are searching for work seem to become “discouraged” 
under unfavorable business cycle conditions because they believe that their chances of finding an ac-
ceptable job are so small that the cost of searching for work outweighs the expected benefits from 
searching. The size of this effect is seen as depending on the expected search cost, which itself de-
pends on the instantaneous search cost (search cost per unit of time) as well as on the chances of find-
ing an acceptable job within a reasonable period of time. Search cost includes monetary as well as psy-
chological “cost”. In our setting a woman who does not work is defined as discouraged if she would 
like to search for work under “peak conditions” but has withdrawn from the labor force under the ac-
tual conditions. This notion is consistent with the definition used by many statistical agencies.1 The 
discouraged worker effect is measured as the fraction of women who are discouraged. In this paper we 
analyze the discouraged worker effect and barriers to employment separately for women born in non-
Western countries and women born in Norway.2  
For economies in a boom, discouraged workers provide a hidden source of manpower since 
they participate to a larger extent in the labor market when chances of getting an acceptable job in-
crease. In contrast, if the economy is in a recession, potential workers withdraw from the labor market 
and by doing so reduce observed unemployment. These workers are not captured by the standard 
measures of unemployment, as they are hard to identify. So, they can be considered as hidden unem-
ployed people.  
Structural analysis of the discouraged worker effect is of interest for several reasons. First, in 
several countries survey questionnaires include questions intended to measure the extent of the dis-
couraged worker phenomenon. Typical survey data are, however, imprecise because they do not fully 
capture the conditions under which persons participating in the survey wish to search for work. As a 
result, direct measurement of the discouraged worker phenomenon might produce estimates that are 
difficult to interpret.3 Second, in addition to measuring the actual (observed) discouraged worker ef-
fect, it might also be of interest to assess the level of this effect in hypothetical settings: that is, under 
conditions different from those that give rise to the observed business cycles. Third, it is also of con-
siderable interest to analyze how the discouraged worker effect varies by key determinants such as 
                                                     
1 For example, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics defines discouraged workers as "persons not in the labor force who want 
and are available for a job and who have looked for work sometime in the past 12 months, but who are not currently looking 
because they believe there are no jobs available or there are none for which they would qualify." 
2 Occasionally we use the term “immigrant women” as a synonym for “women born in non-Western countries”. 
3 The Norwegian Labor Force Surveys also collect direct information on the discouraged worker effect, but the figures from 
the survey are not presented in the official statistics. One reason might be that the number of individuals providing this 
information is rather small as only individuals participating in the survey for the first or eighth time are asked the question.  
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wage rates and socioeconomic covariates. In order to address these three issues a structural approach is 
called for. 
In this paper we propose a new measure related to barriers in the labor market that captures 
both the observed and hidden (discouraged) unemployed. This measure – which we refer to as the 
modified unemployment rate – thus captures the total effect of barriers and search costs in the labor 
market on actual employment. The modified unemployment rate is the (potential) number of women 
in the labor force under peak conditions minus the number of employed women under the actual con-
ditions divided by the number of women in the labor force under peak conditions.  
The motivation for comparing immigrant women and women born in Norway is that the level 
of employment is observed to be significantly lower among immigrant women than among women 
born in Norway and it is of interest to examine why. Typically, two explanations have been offered for 
this phenomenon. The first is that women might decide to search for work but fail to find an accepta-
ble job because of barriers to employment. In Norway many immigrant groups seem to experience 
particular difficulties when searching for work and the unemployment rate is significantly higher 
among them than among women born in Norway, in particular when the economy is in a recession. 
The second explanation is related to differences in cultural background. Many immigrant women 
come from societies where women often do not participate in paid work. In addition, there is a third 
explanation, namely the discouraged worker effect. The discouraged worker phenomenon has not, in 
our view, received the attention it deserves in the public debate. Women may decide voluntarily to 
stay outside the labor market in economic downturns because the psychological as well as the mone-
tary costs of searching for work are higher than the expected pay-off from continuing their search. Ac-
cording to our findings, the discouraged worker effect is particularly important among immigrant 
women, but, to a minor extent, also among women born in Norway with low educational qualifica-
tions.   
In order to formulate a model for labor force participation we apply a particular search theo-
retic approach. Our approach is motivated by the fact that application of the standard search theory in 
empirical contexts is problematic to apply due to identification problems and unobserved heterogene-
ity in preferences and job opportunities. Flinn and Heckman (1982) and Heckman and Singer (1984) 
have shown that standard search theoretic models are fundamentally underidentified. Our model al-
lows for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, search costs and distribution of the value of job of-
fers. Moreover, it is consistent with agents that may each deviate from perfect rationality when as-
sessing their value of search, but satisfy the restrictions that follow from the standard search model on 
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average. 4 From our theoretical approach we obtain an empirical (identified) model for the probability 
of participating in the labor force as a function of the probability of receiving an acceptable job offer. 
Based on this model, we use micro data to analyze labor force participation and barriers in the labor 
market separately for married/cohabiting non-Western female immigrants and similar women born in 
Norway. 
Several studies of the discouraged worker phenomenon are based on macro data (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 1988).5 Empirical studies based on micro data include Ham (1986), Blundell et al. (1987, 
1998), Connolly (1997), Başlevent and Onaran (2003), Bloemen (2005), Hotchkiss and Robertson 
(2006), and Dagsvik et al. (2013). Dagsvik et al. (2013) analyzed the discouraged worker effect among 
women living in Norway without controlling for their immigration status. The present study adds to 
the evidence from that study by analyzing the discouraged worker effect for female immigrants and 
females born in Norway, separately, using micro panel data from the Norwegian Labor Force Surveys 
(LFS) over a fairly long period of time: that is, for each quarter from the second quarter of 1988 to the 
fourth quarter of 2010. As opposed to most other studies in this field, including Dagsvik et al. (2013), 
we apply panel data with two observations for each individual. This type of data enables us to obtain 
more reliable estimates compared to studies that use only repeated cross-section data, because panel 
data provide observations on actual individual transitions in the labor market and therefore represent 
information on how individuals actually adjust behavior as a result of changes in observed and unob-
served incentives and variation in preferences. However, the data do not contain information about 
search durations. 
An interesting finding is that the estimates of the parameter representing search cost per unit 
of time is much higher for women born in Norway than for immigrant women. An immigrant woman 
facing the same probability of obtaining work as a woman born in Norway is then less likely to be dis-
couraged from searching for work than a woman born in Norway. However, the fraction of discour-
aged workers is, for most groups, much higher for immigrant women than for women born in Norway. 
The reason is that the estimated total (expected) cost of search is, on average, found to be higher for 
immigrant women than for women born in Norway. The total expected cost is the cost per unit of time 
times the expected duration of search until an acceptable job offer arrives. Since the expected duration 
of search is typically found to be substantially longer for immigrant women than for women born in 
                                                     
4 Thaler (2015), among others, has demonstrated in a number of studies that individuals only to a limited extent seem to 
behave rationally according to theory (see also Conlisk, 1996). In particular, the laboratory experiments analyzed in Brown et 
al. (2011) cast serious doubt about the ability of agents to assess a constant reservation wage in a stationary search 
environment. 
5 Some recent studies that have analyzed the discouraged worker issue using macro time series data are Benati (2001), Darby 
et al. (2001), Vendrik and Cörvers (2009), Österholm (2010), Emerson et al. (2011), Fuchs and Weber (2017) and 
Provenzano (2017). All these studies find significant discouraged workers effects, at least for subgroups in their samples. 
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Norway, the expected cost of search among immigrant women is higher than for women born in Nor-
way.  
The model is estimated on a sample that is not fully representative for the whole population. In 
order to use the model to simulate representative levels of labor force participation, employment and 
discouraged worker effect for the target population (married or cohabiting women), we have estab-
lished a comprehensive micro population for 2005 with information about all the explanatory variables 
in the model.  
Whereas the unemployment rate (across time and population groups) for married or cohabiting 
women from non-Western countries is about 17 per cent we find that the corresponding modified un-
employment rate is about 25 per cent. For married or cohabiting women born in Norway the unem-
ployment rate is about 3 per cent and the modified unemployment rate is about 5 per cent. For married 
or cohabiting women from non-Western countries who migrated to Norway less than 5 years ago, have 
length of schooling less than 13 years and have age less than 35 years the unemployment rate is about 
33 per cent and the modified unemployment rate is about 53 per cent. These figures show that the dis-
couraged worker effect is substantial. They also clearly indicate that it is important to account for the 
discouraged worker effect when discussing barriers in the labor market. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define formally the notion of discouraged 
worker and the modified unemployment rate. In Section 3 the search-theoretic framework is devel-
oped. In Section 4 the empirical model is derived. Data issues are the topic of Section 5. In Section 6 
we provide estimation results and assessment of fit. Finally, in Section 7 we formally define the con-
cepts discouraged worker effect and modified unemployment rate and then quantify them for immi-
grant women and for women born in Norway, respectively.  
2. Discouraged workers and modified unemployment 
The purpose of this section is to formalize and make precise the concepts of discouraged workers and 
modified unemployment. For simplicity, the indexation of time and individual is suppressed in this 
section. To this end, let q  be the conditional probability that the agent shall be employed given that 
the agent belongs to the labor force. The empirical counterpart of q is one minus the unemployment 
rate. Let ( )P q  be the probability of being in the labor force. That is, ( )P q  is the supply of labor (at 
the extensive margin). As mentioned in the introduction, it is commonly observed that the fraction of 
agents in the labor force seems to vary with the business cycle. That is, ( )P q  seems to be an 
increasing function of q. In the subsequent sections we shall discuss a theoretical approach that will 
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lead to a particular model for ( ).P q  For now, we simply assume that such a model has been 
established.  
We define the peak condition in the labor market as a situation in which 0q q where 0q  is a 
reference conditional probability of being employed, given labor force participation, under the most 
favorable business cycle conditions for the workers. The probability of being a discouraged worker is 
given by 0( ) ( ).P q P q  That is, a woman is discouraged if she does not belong to the labor force 
under the current conditions but would prefer to enter the labor force under peak conditions. This 
notion of discouraged worker is consistent with the informal definition given in the introduction. The 
modified unemployment rate is defined by 0 0( ( ) ( ) ) / ( ).P q P q q P q  The empirical counterpart of the 
modified unemployment rate is the (potential) number of women in the labor force under peak 
conditions minus the number of employed women under the actual conditions divided by the number 
of women in the labor force under peak conditions. This measure then captures both ordinary observed 
unemployment and the discouraged worker effect. In empirical applications, one may define the 
reference level 
0q  as the highest value of all the estimated acceptable job offer arrival rates (across 
population groups and across time).  
 Thus, in order to calculate modified unemployment rates, it is necessary to establish a model 
for the probability of being in the labor force, as a function of the conditional probability of being em-
ployed given participation in the labor force. This is the goal of the next section. 
3. Modeling labor force participation 
This section discusses our approach to characterizing the probability of being in the labor force as a 
function of the conditional probability of being in the labor force given participation. To this end, we 
first address the problem of characterizing the decision rule of whether to be in the labor force or not. 
Our approach departs from the standard one state job search model. In order to clarify the difference 
between our approach and the standard search-theoretic approach, we start by reviewing the standard 
search model.  
3.1. The standard search model 
In one version of the standard search model, the agent is assumed to operate in a stationary 
environment where job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process in discrete time. Let 1U  be the 
present value of search, K an index that equals 1 if a job offer is arriving in the period and zero 
otherwise, 2U  the utility of the arriving job offer,   the discount factor and C the real cost of search 
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per unit of time, respectively. The agent is uncertain about which job offers arrive and when they 
arrive. However, she is supposed to know C, the job offer arrival rate and the distribution function of 
the utilities of the arriving job offers. By applying Bellman’s optimality principle (Lippman and 
McCall, 1976), it follows that 
  
1 1 2(max( , / (1 ))) ,
sU E U KU C            (1)
  
where
sE denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information of the agent. The first term 
on the right-hand side of the equation is the discounted expected value of search. In principle, one can 
solve (1) for 1U  (the reservation value) as a function of , C, the expected job offer arrival rate 
sE K  
and the distribution function of 2.U  In the particular case where 1   an optimal policy still exists 
where now 2U  is interpreted as the lump sum value of the job offer over the infinite horizon. The 
value of search in this case is determined by  
   1 1 2max ,
sU E U KU C         (2) 
(Flinn and Heckman, 1982). This simple job search model has been generalized in a number of ways, 
see Rogerson et al. (2005). 
The application of (1) or (2) in empirical analyses poses several problems. As discussed by 
Heckman and Singer (1984) the search model described above is not identified even if there are no 
regressors or unobservables in the model. Even if data on accepted wages (when 2U  equals the wage 
rate) were available (which is typically not the case) the model is not identified unless the c.d.f. 
satisfies a recoverability condition (Heckman and Singer, 1984). This is due to the fact that the 
econometrician does not know the discount rate, the search cost, the job offer arrival rate and the 
distribution function of 2.U  Specifically, the discount rate, search cost and the distribution of 2U  may 
vary across agents both with respect to observed and unobserved individual characteristics. 
Furthermore, perfect rational behavior, as represented by (3.1) or (3.2), may not hold, because, as 
indicated, the agent may have difficulties assessing the precise value of search as represented by the 
equations above.  
3.2. Unobserved heterogeneity and aggregate rationality   
The analysis above is relevant for a given agent and an environment with only two states, “employed” 
and “unemployed”. Now we consider a setting with three states, namely “out of the labor force”, 
“unemployed” and “employed”. Moreover, in our setting we have to deal with a population of agents 
where both preferences and job opportunities are heterogeneous. In Section 2.1 we mentioned that the 
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standard search model is not identified. However, for our purpose we are not interested in identifying 
all the components of the search model. Specifically, it suffices to obtain a characterization of the 
value of being unemployed as a function of the probability of being employed given labor force 
participation. As we shall show in this section, this allows us to work with weaker assumptions than 
those of the standard approach, which will lead to a structural model that is useful for empirical 
analysis and will eventually enable us to calculate modified unemployment rates. In this case it is 
necessary to introduce indexation of time periods. The individual agent may either be out of the labor 
force, searching for work, or employed. The utility of being out of the labor force is denoted 0.U  The 
utility of a job offer, 2 ,U  will depend on the corresponding offered wage rate, but also on non-
pecuniary attributes of the job offer, such as location, tasks to be performed, etc. We maintain the 
assumption that the agent operates as if she were in a stationary environment. Thus, although the 
utilities and the arrival rate of job offers may change over time periods, the agent is supposed to assess 
the value of search as if she were in a stationary environment, conditional on the available information 
at the current period. We also assume that an unemployed woman is only capable of taking into 
account the expected value of future job offers and ignores the possibility of withdrawing from the 
labor force and the possibility of being laid off in the future when calculating the value of search.  
 
 Assumption 1 
 The variables 0U  and 2U  have the following structure: 
              0 0 0 0U u Z       and   2 2 2 2 ,U u Z     
where { }ju , j = 0,2, are deterministic functions that depend on selected covariates and 0 2{ , }   are 
zero mean random unobserved variables that are independent across time. Furthermore, 0Z  and 2Z  
are i.i.d. zero mean random effects that are known to the agent and independent of 0 2{ , }.   
 
The random effects 0Z  and 2Z  are supposed to capture unobservables that do not change over 
time. Specifically, 2Z  may capture systematic (unobservable) aspects of the job offers associated with 
the qualifications of the agent that are perfectly known to her. The random error terms 0  and 2 are 
supposed to capture the effect of unobservables that vary randomly over time. The assumption that the 
error terms 0 2{ , }   are serially independent does not seem overly restrictive since unobservables that 
are permanent are captured by the random effects.  
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Assumption 2 
 The agents operate with discount factor that is equal to 1. 
 
Under Assumption 2 it follows that the optimal policy is determined by (2). The agent is 
supposed to assess the (subjective) distribution of 
2  conditional on unobservable factors that are 
known to the agents. However, she is allowed to make mistakes when evaluating the value of search. 
This means that instead of (3.2) we now assume that the following equation holds 
 1 1 2max( , )
sU E U KU C          
      (3)  
where   is an error term which represents the deviation from perfect rationality in the agent’s 
evaluation of the value of search. In this setting the search cost per unit of time, or disutility C, is 
supposed to capture both economic as well as psychological costs and stress associated with job 
search.  
 
Assumption 3 (Aggregate rational expectations) 
Aggregate rational expectation holds in the sense that 
2( | ) 0,
pE Z   where 
pE is the 
population expectation operator. Furthermore, the search costs are independent of the random effects 
and the job offer arrivals.  
 
Assumptions 2 and 3 are motivated by bounded rationality. By the law of iterated 
expectations, we obtain that 
1 2 2 1 2 2(max( , ) | ) (max( , ) | ).
p s pE E U KU Z E U KU Z  
As a result, it follows from Assumption 3 by taking expectations on both sides of the equation in (3) 
that   
  1 2 1 2 2 2( | ) (max( , ) | ) ( | ).
p p pE U Z E U KU Z E C Z      (4) 
Let ,
pE K   that is,   is the probability (objective) of a job arrival in a period. Since by assumption 
the job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process we have that  
  1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2(max( , ) | ) (1 ) ( | ) (max( , ) | ).
p p pE U KU Z E U Z E U U Z      
The above equation implies that  
  1 2 1 2 2( | ) (max( , ) | )
p p cE U Z E U U Z

         (5) 
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where 2( | ) .
p pc E C Z E C   Recall that, although suppressed in the notation here, the systematic 
terms , 0u  and 2u  may change over time periods (year), as indicated above. The relationship in (5) 
means that although the optimal search equation might not hold at the individual level, it holds on 
average within population groups with the same value of the random effect 2Z  and conditional on 
selected observed covariates (suppressed in the notation here). In this sense our approach can be 
viewed as a version of bounded rationality that relaxes the strict rationality assumption represented in 
standard search theory.  
 Above, it is implicit that the population expectation operator pE  is understood to be a 
conditional operator given observed covariates to be introduced later. There are two sources of 
randomness that affect the random variation in 1.U  First, 1U  depends on the agent’s subjective 
distribution of 2U  that may vary in a seemingly random manner. The variations in this distribution are 
due to the agent’s inability to assess the distribution of the utilities of future job offers precisely. 
Second, 1U  depends on   which also may fluctuate over time in a random way. Variations in   are 
due to the agent’s inability to calculate precisely the value of search given the job arrival rate, the 
subjective distributions of 2U  and the individual search costs. The error term   may also capture 
possible error in the agent’s assessment of the arrival rate of job offers. Without further assumptions 
one cannot say more about the properties of 
1.U  Even with distributional assumptions about 2U  one 
cannot determine the distribution of 
1.U   
 
Assumption 4 (probabilistic rationality) 
 The error terms , 0,1,2,j j   are independent with Gumbel distribution exp( )
xe  
where 0   is a dispersion parameter. 6       
 
Assumption 4 is consistent with the following version of Luce Choice Axiom, (Luce, 1959) 
(equivalent to the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, IIA). In order to give a brief 
explanation of the Choice Axiom, let   be a set consisting of the alternatives “working”, “searching 
for work” and “out of the labor force”, let B be a set, ,B    where B contains at least two 
alternatives and let ( )J B  denote the most preferred alternative in B. Consider the relation 
         0 2 0 2( ( ) | ( ) ,{ , }) ( ( ) |{ , })P J j J B Z Z P J B j Z Z       
                                                     
6 Remember that the Gumbel c.d.f. with zero mean has the form exp( exp((0.5772 ) / ))x   , where 0.5772 is Euler’s 
constant and   is a positive scale parameter. 
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for .j B  This relationship states that the choice of an alternative in the choice set   given that 
the most preferred alternative belongs to a subset B, is, on average, the same as making the choice 
from the set B.  In other words, given that the most preferred alternative belongs to B then the 
alternatives in \ B  become irrelevant (on average). Luce (1977) refers to the assumption expressed 
in Assumption 4 as a probabilistic rationality postulate.7 In other words, IIA is an aggregate rationality 
postulate. The IIA assumption can be restrictive in cases with unobserved attributes that are common 
for some alternatives. In our case where IIA is only supposed to hold conditional on the random 
effects 
0Z  and 2Z  where the latter variable is common to alternatives 1 and 2, IIA seems reasonable. 
 
Theorem 1 
If Assumptions 1 to 4 hold, then the mean utility of search is determined by   
  
1
1 1 2 2 2( | ) log[exp( / ) 1]
pu E U Z u Z c            (6) 
where 6 j/ Var .     
  
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. The result in Theorem 1 shows that one 
can express the mean value of search explicitly in terms of the mean value of job offers and / .c   
Note that 
1  has the interpretation as the inter-arrival mean time between job offers. Hence, /c   is 
the inter-arrival mean cost of search. Theorem 1 thus states that the average value of searching 
depends on the inter-arrival mean search cost. We also note that the relation in (6)  has the intuitively 
reasonable property that when / 0,c    then 1 .u   Thus, Theorem 1  yields a complete 
characterization of the value of search. Moreover, our theoretical approach has led to an essential 
simplification in that the average value of search can be expressed as a rather simple function of 2u , 
2Z  and / .c    
 Unfortunately, the result in (6) is not directly applicable empirically because the job 
arrival probability   is not observed. What is observed is the flow from unemployment to 
employment, and vice versa, which is the empirical counterpart of the probability of receiving an 
acceptable job offer conditional on job search. Let q denote the probability of receiving an acceptable 
                                                     
7 In his conclusion, Luce (1977) characterizes the choice axiom as follows: “Perhaps the greatest strength of the choice 
axiom, and one reason it continues to be used, is as a canon of probabilistic rationality. It is a natural probabilistic 
formulation of K. J. Arrow’s famed principle of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and as such it is a possible 
underpinning for rational, probabilistic theories of social behavior. Thus, in the development of economic theory based on the 
assumption of probabilistic individual choice behavior, it can play a role analogous to the algebraic rationality postulates of 
the traditional theory.” 
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job offer, given search. For the sake of interpretation, consider the distribution of the duration of 
search. Let T  denote the total duration of search. It is easy to prove that T is distributed according to a 
geometric distribution which has the property that 
1.ET q  Hence, whereas c is the expected (real) 
cost of search per unit of time, 
1cq  can be interpreted as the total expected cost of search. Under the 
assumptions of Theorem 1 and the fact that 2 1   has a logistic c.d.f. that it follows readily that  
  2 1 2 2 2 1 1
1 2 2
1
( ) ( ) 1 exp( / ).
1 exp( )
P U U P u Z u c
u u Z
   
  
         
  
    
Consequently, since 
2 1( )q P U U   we obtain that 
      
2 1
/
( ) 1 exp( / )
c c c
q P U U c
   
  
 
  
              (7) 
which shows that /c q  is determined by / .c   Moreover, we have the following result. 
 
Corollary 1 
 Under Assumptions 1 to 4 the mean value of search can be expressed as 
  
1
1 2 2 ( / )u u Z h c q 
   , 
where h is a function defined on (0, )  that is strictly increasing, concave and uniquely determined by 
the equation 
  (1 exp( ( )))log(1 exp( ( )))h x h x x.      
Furthermore, when x increases h approaches the identity mapping. 
 
 The proof of Corollary 1 is given in Appendix A. The result of Corollary 1 is particularly 
interesting since it shows that under probabilistic rationality (Assumption 4) in addition to 
Assumptions 1 to 3 the function h is strictly increasing, concave and uniquely determined.  
3.3. Labor force participation  
We shall now discuss the implications of our theory for the probability of labor force participation and 
the discouraged worker effect. First, we need to consider the distributional properties of the random 
effects. From Assumptions 1 to 3 and Corollary 1 we obtain that the conditional probability that the 
agent will be in the labor force, given the random effects 0Z  and 2 ,Z  is equal to 
       
1 0 0 2
1 0 0
1
( | , )
1 exp( ( ) ))
P U U Z Z
u u Z 
 
   
    
 (8) 
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2 0 2 0
1
.
1 exp( ( / ) ))u h c q u Z Z    

     
 
To characterize the distributional properties of the random effects we make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 5 
 The distribution of the random effect  
2 0Z Z   satisfies 
       
2 0
1 1
1 exp( ) 1 exp( )
E
v Z Z v  
 
 
      
   
for any real v where 0 1.    
 
 Assumption 5 asserts that the main difference between the unobservables represented by 
the error terms 0 1( , )   and the unobservables represented by the random effects is that 
2 0 1 0Z Z      only differs from the distribution of 1 0   by a scale transformation which accounts 
for the fact that the variance of 2 0 1 0Z Z     is greater than the variance of 1 0.   As a result, 
aggregation of the conditional choice probability above with respect to the random effects produces an 
unconditional choice probability of the same form, apart from a scale transformation of the precision 
parameter .   
The invariance under aggregation property expressed in Assumption 5 is, however, not 
essential for our empirical analysis. An alternative would be to assume normally distributed random 
effects. Dagsvik (2018) has proved that Assumption 5 holds if and only if the distribution of 
2 0Z Z   has p.d.f. ( )f z  defined on ( , )   that is given by 
   
1 sin( )
( )
2cos( )z z
f z
e e
  

 
 
 
     (9) 
where the parameter   is related to the variance of 2 0Z Z   by   
    
2
2
2 0( ) 1 .
3
Var Z Z

             (10) 
To make this paper self-contained Dagsvik’s proof of (9) is also given in Appendix B.8 The p.d.f. 
( )f z  is symmetric around zero and has variance that increases without bounds as 0.   The 
distribution ( )f z  is similar to the normal distribution but has heavier tails than the normal 
                                                     
8 The result in (11) is related to results obtained by Cardell (1997). He proves that if the random effect is distributed as in (9) 
then Assumption 4 holds. 
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distribution. Moreover, it follows that the autocorrelation function of the error term process 
2 0 1 0{ }Z Z      is given by 
21 .  The main advantage with the distribution ( )f z  is that it implies 
that the participation probability can be expressed on closed form by 
  
1 0
2 0
1
( ) .
1 exp( ( ( / ) ))
P U U
u h c q u   
 
   
    (11) 
4. Empirical model 
In this section it is convenient to introduce indexation of both individuals and time. Let 
itq  denote 
the probability that individual i will be employed given participation in the labor force in year 
t. From Corollary 1 it follows that the function ( )h x x  when 5.x   Preliminary estimation results 
indicate that c  is of order of magnitude between 5 and 6 for immigrant women and between 28 and 
29 for women born in Norway. Since 1itq   this implies that / 5itc q   for immigrant women and 
/ 28itc q  for women born in Norway. Thus we can safely write
9 
             ( / ) / .it ith c q c q                         
(12) 
Hence, according to Corollary 1 we can express the utility of search as 
  
1
1 2 2 1 .i t i t i it i tU u Z cq    
                       (13) 
 
Assumption 6 
The systematic term of utility of the job offers is given by 
  2 logi t itu E W   
where itW  is the agent-specific wage rate. The wage rate is modeled by 
 0log it t it i itW X               
 (14)  
where the intercept 0t  may depend on time, itX is a vector of covariates (given in Table C1 in 
Appendix C), i  is a random effect with zero mean and { }it are serially uncorrelated random terms 
with zero mean. The systematic part of the utility of being out of the labor force is given by 
  0i t itu V            (15) 
                                                     
9 The estimation results do not depend critically on the assumption that ( ) .h x x  It is easily realized that the estimation 
results are consistent with a linear approximation of h. 
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where 
itV  is a vector of covariates (specified in Table 2). Furthermore, (13) holds where itq is 
represented by a logit function depending on a vector of covariates (which are specified in Table C2 
in Appendix C).  
 
The wage equation in (15) is used to predict wage rates for women who do not work when 
estimating the model for labor force participation. The wage equation is also used to predict wages for 
those who work.10 Hence, if follows from (14) and (15) that 
   2 0 .i t t itu X           (16) 
Since the number of observations in the respective subgroups of individuals in the labor force surveys 
is rather small, a (reduced form) logit model for itq  is introduced in order to obtain more reliable 
predictions of the probabilities of obtaining an acceptable job conditional on particular covariates.  
Let 2 0 .i i iZ Z Z    From (8), (10), (12) to (15) it follows that 
        1 0( ) ( | )it i i t i t iP Z P U U Z   1
0
1
.
1 exp( ( ) )t it it it iX V cq Z    


     
 
 (17) 
Furthermore, it follows from (2.17) that11 
           1 0 1
0
1
( ) ( ) .
1 exp( ( ) )
it it i i t i t
t it it it
P EP Z P U U
X V cq     
   
    
 
 (18) 
Our sample has a rotating panel structure. In order to express the likelihood function, let 
1itY   if the woman is in the labor force in year t and zero otherwise. Consequently, we can write the 
log-likelihood function as 
               
, 1 , 111
, 1 , 1( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))
i t i tit it
Y YY Y
it i it i i t i i t i
i t
L E P Z P Z P Z P Z 

 
 
   
 
      (19)
  
where the expectation operator is taken with respect to .iZ  To calculate (4.9) we apply a Monte Carlo 
simulation approach. That is, we approximate L by L  given by 
                                                     
10 In the predictions of logWit , the random effects are set to zero. 
11 It is of interest to note that the relations in (17) and (18) are similar to macro time series analyses where relative changes in 
labor force participation (or the corresponding log-odds) is specified as a linear function of unemployment (1 )tq  and other 
variables. 
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     , 1 , 1111 , 1 , 1
1
( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))i t i tit it
M
Y YY Y
it ir it ir i t ir i t ir
ri t
L M P Z P Z P Z P Z 

 

      
  (20) 
where , 1,2,..., ,irZ r M  are independent simulated copies of .iZ  For a detailed description of the sim-
ulation procedure, see Appendix D. 
As previously mentioned, since we do not have precise estimates of ,itq we estimate a logit 
model for itq based on the subsample of women who are in the labor force, separately for the two 
groups of women. An alternative specification would be to use more aggregate versions of the proba-
bilities { }itq  to represent the women’s information about their chances in the labor market. For exam-
ple, one could use the overall unemployment rate separately for the two groups of women as an esti-
mate of 1 .itq In principle, one could estimate different versions of the model and check which of 
them are better able to explain the data. However, in our case this is difficult because the data only 
cover a few business cycle fluctuations. This creates difficulties in providing reliable identification of 
the discouraged worker effect without using variations in itq  across individuals.  
5. Data 
The data are obtained by linking information from the Norwegian Labor Force Surveys (LFS) 1988–
2010 with information from the Norwegian Educational Database, registries with income information 
from the tax authorities (1988–2010) and the population registries with information about family 
composition in different years, as well as country of birth for immigrants and their first year of 
residence in Norway. Information about whether the person lives in a densely populated area is also 
obtained from the population registries. All registers and survey data are linked using a personal 
identification key.  
    In the selection of the sample we include only married women aged 25–60 years. The lower 
age limit excludes most women enrolled in higher education, while the upper age limit excludes 
women that might withdraw from the labor force due to early retirement. In addition to the selection 
based on age and marital status, we also exclude women who are disabled or claim that they are 
unable to work. Self-employed women and women hired in firms run by family members are also 
excluded.     
 The Norwegian LFS follow the international recommendations for labor force surveys 
where persons are classified as being employed, unemployed or outside the labor force, etc. Working 
time is measured as contractual hours of work on an annual basis in both the main and any possible 
second jobs. If this information is missing and the respondent is active in the labor market, information 
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about actual working time is used. Nominal hourly wages are measured as labor income divided by 
annual working time. To ensure time consistency, we have chosen to use a measure of non-labor in-
come that includes salary of the husband as well as stipulated labor income for self-employed hus-
bands. The nominal hourly wage and non-labor income variables are deflated by the official Norwe-
gian consumer price index, with 2010 as the reference year. Based on the information in the registries, 
we also calculate the number of children in each household aged 03 years, 46 years and 718 years. 
Education is measured in years of achieved level of schooling and work experience is defined as age 
minus length of schooling minus 7. Duration of residence in Norway in a particular year is calculated 
as the number of years from the first year of residence. Urbanity is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one if the person lives in a densely populated area, and zero otherwise. According to Statistics Norway 
a collection of houses is registered as a densely populated area if there are at least 200 people living 
there and the distances between the houses do not exceed 50 meters.         
 The Norwegian LFS are quarterly and the samples are rotating. In the estimation of the 
model we make use of the fact that it is possible to observe a person in the same quarter in two 
consecutive years. Thus, each woman in the sample is observed twice, and by observing women in the 
same quarter in both years, we avoid problems related to seasonal fluctuations. Note, however, that the 
sample includes observations from all four quarters during a year. The reason we exclude women who 
are not observed twice is that the behavior of this group of women in the labor market seems to be 
fundamentally different from that of other women.12  
The empirical analysis is done separately for women born in Norway and for female non-
Western immigrants. Non-Western immigrants include immigrants born in Eastern Europe, Africa, 
Asia, South and Central America. We have excluded immigrants born in Western countries, Australia, 
New Zealand and North America because we want to focus on immigrants with a substantially 
different cultural background compared to those born in Norway. In total the sample consists of 
52,101 women born in Norway and 1,724 immigrant women. Table 1 gives summary statistics for the 
women for 1999, which is in the middle of the period of analysis. Membership rates in trade unions 
are high among Norwegian women and many  
 
  
                                                     
12 One of the most frequent reasons for non-response in the LFS is the difficulty of getting in contact with the interview 
objects. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for women born in non-Western countries and women born in 
Norway (1999) 
 Women born in non-Western countries Women born in Norway 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Age 37.1 7.3 25 60 42.0 9.5 25 60 
Education (years) 12.4 3.3 6 20 12.6 2.8 9 20 
Experience (years) 18.6 7.5 5 41 23.4 10.4 2 41 
# children 0-3 years 0.4 0.6 0 2 0.3 0.5 0 2 
# children 4-6 years 0.2 0.5 0 2 0.2 0.5 0 2 
# children 7-18 years 0.9 1.1 0 4 0.7 1.0 0 4 
Non-labor incomea 343,531 185,439 58,401 185,439 385,643 185,243 58,401 1,325,439 
Wage rateb 120.0 16.5 91.2 181.7 135.3 15.2 103.6 194.8 
Participation rate 0.75 0.44 0 1 0.91 0.29 0 1 
a In constant 2010 NOK.                                                                                                                                                 
bPredicted wage rate in constant 2010 NOK. 
women work in the public sector. Dagsvik et al. (2016) provide more detailed information about the 
data used in the estimations. 
So far, we have discussed the data used in the estimations. It is, however, of interest to apply the 
model for prediction of participation, unemployment and discouraged workers for the whole Norwegian 
population. As the sample used in the estimations of the model is not representative for our target 
population, in particular with respect to immigrant women, we have prepared another data set for 
prediction purposes. This data set is based on the Norwegian Income Registry 2005, representing the 
total Norwegian population.13 For all women (of interest) it contains information about all the 
individual explanatory variables of the model: that is, non-labor income, length of schooling, (potential) 
work experience, duration of residence, urbanity dummy, age and the number of children in the 
specific age groups. The selection rules used for the micro population are as follows: we have removed 
women with public and private pensions in excess of 125,000 NOK (in nominal terms). This income 
limit is consistent with the maximum pension income in the data used in the estimation of the 
participation model, and by imposing this restriction we omit women who are unable to participate in 
the labor market. To capture the fact that we are modeling the decision to participate in paid work and 
not self-employment, women with more income from self-employment than wage incomes are 
excluded. In addition, about 20 per cent of the immigrant women are excluded due to missing 
information about their educational attainment. As in the estimations, we have carried out the 
                                                     
13 Data for the Income Registry cannot be used for estimation of the model as it does not include sufficient information about 
labor market participation and unemployment. 
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simulations separately for married/cohabitating women of age 25–60 born in non-Western countries 
(41,339 obs.) and Norway (555,209 obs.).   
6. Estimation results 
Estimation of the participation model requires predictions from the wage equation as well as from the 
model for the probability of getting an acceptable job offer for each woman. These estimations are 
done separately for immigrant and non-immigrant women, on samples of employed women and 
women in the labor force, respectively. Table C1 and Table C2 in Appendix C contain the estimation 
results for the wage equation and the job offer probability, respectively.14 The components of the 
(preference) vector itV (cf. Eq. (3.4) and Table 2 below) are 1, age, age squared, real non-labor income, 
the number of children aged 0–3 years, the number of children aged 4–6 years and the number of 
children aged 7–18 years. 
In Table 2 we report parameter estimates of the probability of labor force participation for 
women born in non-Western countries and women born in Norway. From the table we notice that the 
estimate of ,  which represents the variance of the random effect as well as the strength of the serial 
correlation in the utility functions, is somewhat higher for the women born in non-Western countries 
than it is for those born in Norway. It follows from (3.12) that the estimated serial correlation of the 
error terms in the utility functions is equal to about 0.80 for immigrant women and 0.88 for women 
born in Norway. The estimate of , which is inversely proportionate to the standard deviation of jt , 
is higher for women born in Norway (=12.3) than for immigrant women (=6.7). However, the most 
striking result in Table 2 is how different the estimates of the parameter that represents the cost 
(disutility) per unit of time ( )c  are between women born in Norway and women born in non-Western 
countries. The estimate for women born in Norway is more than three times as large as the estimate 
for women born in non-Western countries. We interpret this finding as being due to the difference in 
psychological costs. Non-Western immigrant women often come from economies where 
unemployment is high and accordingly it may be hard to get job offers. Thus, immigrant women are 
typically more used to demanding labor market conditions than women born in Norway. 
Consequently, immigrant women who are interested in entering the labor force will not be as easily 
discouraged as women born in Norway. Another possible explanation might stem from a selection 
effect: women who migrate may be more motivated for entering the labor force and less concerned 
                                                     
14 In a preliminary stage we used Heckman’s two-stage procedure for controlling for self-selection, but we found no 
significant selection effect. 
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with the psychological stress and uncertainty associated with job search than women who do not 
migrate.  
 
Table 2. Estimation results for the probability of labor force participation. Women born in non-
Western countries and women born in Norway  
 Women born in non-
Western countries 
Women born in Norway 
Variable/parameter Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
   3.011 8.474 4.237 42.195 
Search cost per unit of time c   0.753 5.103 2.307 14.434 
Constant, 1 –4.735 –11.981 –4.194 –57.393 
Age, 2 0.046 2.170 0.019 5.335 
(Age/10)2, 3 –0.073 –2.733 –0.040 –9.449 
(Real non-labor income)  10-5, 4 –0.018 –1.956 –0.025 –15.903 
No. of children 0–3, 5 –0.305 –6.760 –0.199 –28.780 
No. of children 4–6, 6 –0.072 –2.224 –0.147 –22.804 
No. of children 7–18, 7 –0.106 –5.236 –0.075 –18.221 
Serial correlation,*     0.450 13.568 0.344 56.524 
No. of observations 3,448  104,202  
No. of observation units  1,724  52,101  
Log-likelihood –1,424.8  –25,562.9  
M 150  150  
McFadden’s 
2   0.40  0.65  
*Panel data are necessary in order to identify and estimate  and   separately. If only independent cross-section data are 
available, one can still estimate   and all the other parameters of the model. 
 
Also, the estimate of the parameter relating to real non-labor income is not significantly 
different between the two groups. This estimate is substantially larger for women born in Norway than 
it is for women born in non-Western countries. Besides, the estimate for the latter group is on the 
border of being insignificant at the 5 percent level. The estimates of the parameters determining the 
effects of children are fairly equal for the two groups. For women born in Norway the smallest effect 
is found for children in the oldest age group, whereas for women born in non-Western countries the 
smallest estimate is found for children in the middle age group.   
As measures of goodness-of-fit we have calculated McFadden’s 
2
  and also empirical and 
predicted participation rates. The values of 
2
  are 0.40 for immigrant women and 0.65 for women 
born in Norway (Table 2), which indicate a fairly good fit. Table 3 displays aggregate predicted 
participation rates based on the estimated model together with observed participation rates in the 
sample. The predicted figures are average predicted participation probabilities across all women in the 
actual group, and we use the same sample that was used in the estimations (in-sample comparison). 
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We notice that the estimated models fit the data quite well.15 The predictions capture the increase in 
labor market participation over time for both groups of women. 
 
Table 3. Observed and predicted labor force participation rates 
 Women born in non-Western countries  Women born in Norway 
Period Observed Std. dev. Predicted Observed Std. dev. Predicted 
1988–1990 0.714 0.032 0.696 0.829 0.003 0.834 
1991–1993 0.665 0.024 0.624 0.856 0.002 0.862 
1994–1996 0.648 0.020 0.650 0.880 0.002 0.876 
1997–1999 0.725 0.023 0.741 0.907 0.003 0.888 
2000–2002 0.749 0.022 0.781 0.927 0.003 0.920 
2003–2005 0.776 0.018 0.772 0.937 0.002 0.933 
2006–2008 0.845 0.014 0.845 0.953 0.002 0.956 
2009–2010 0.865 0.019 0.880 0.967 0.003 0.969 
1988–2010 0.752 0.007 0.753 0.891 0.001 0.889 
7. The discouraged worker effect and barriers to employment 
In this section we formalize what we mean by the discouraged worker effect and how it relates to our 
empirical model and how we can use the model to obtain corresponding quantitative measures.  
Recall that we define the peak condition in the labor market as a situation in which 0q q  
where 0q   is a reference probability of being employed, given participation in the labor force). To 
emphasize that the utility of search is a function of the probability of receiving an acceptable job we 
write 1 1 ( )t t tU U q , where 1tU  is given in (13). We say that a worker is discouraged at time t if 
  
0
1 0 1( ) ( ).t t t tU q U U q          (21) 
In other words, the inequalities in (21) assert that a worker is discouraged if the value of search under 
the peak condition is greater than the utility of being out of the labor force, whereas the value of search 
under the actual labor market condition is less than the utility of not working. Thus, our notion of 
discouraged worker depends crucially on the assumption that information about the women’s chances 
of obtaining an acceptable job are (on average) captured reasonably well by the probabilities { }.itq  In 
addition, it depends on the reference value 
0q  that corresponds to the peak condition of the labor 
market. Let  
        1 0( ) ( ( ) ).t t t t tP q P U q U    
It follows from (7.1) that the probability of being a discouraged worker equals 
                                                     
15 One reason why the figures in Table 3 vary so much over time is that the sample survey is rotating. 
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0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ).t t t t t t t t t t t t t tD q P U q U U q P U q U P U q U P q P q           (22)         
In this paper ( )t tD q is our measure of the discouraged worker effect. From (22) one may define the 
modified unemployment rate as 0 0( ( ) ( ) ) / ( ).t t t t tP q P q q P q  The empirical counterpart of the modified 
unemployment rate is the (potential) number of women in the labor force under peak conditions minus 
the number of employed women under the actual conditions divided by the number of women in the 
labor force under peak conditions. This measure then captures both ordinary observed unemployment 
and the discouraged worker effect. In empirical applications, one may define the reference level 
0q  as 
the highest value of all the estimated acceptable job offer arrival rates (across population groups and 
across time). In our sample, the highest value of itq  is about 0.99 and we have therefore chosen to let 
0 1.q   
Table 4 displays measures of the discouraged worker effect and the effect of barriers 
(represented by tq ) to employment for selected population groups. Specifically, we have divided the 
immigrant women into 12 specific subgroups depending on their duration of residence in Norway, 
their actual education and their age. We have also provided results for women born in Norway (see the 
four last rows). The last column of the table shows the number of observations in each group for the 
entire population in 2005. As regard barriers to employment, we note that the unemployment rate for 
young immigrant women with a low level of schooling and a short time since arrival (group 1) is high, 
about 33 percent, decreasing to about 22 per cent for group 6, where time since arrival is 5–10 years 
and the women are aged 35+. The lowest unemployment rate among immigrant women is for group 
12, which contains women with high education, aged 45+, who have been in Norway for more than 10 
years. In contrast, the unemployment rate for women born in Norway is much lower for all levels of 
education and age. For this group the probability of not getting an acceptable job varies between 1 and 
7 percent.  
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Table 4. Labor force participation, employment and discouraged worker effect by age, 
education and duration of residence. 2005  
Group Duration 
of res. 
(D) 
Length 
of edu-
cation 
(E) 
Age 
(A) 
Partici-
pation 
ratea 
Employ-
ment 
rateb 
Un-
employ-
ment 
ratec 
Disc. 
worker 
effectd 
Modified 
unemploy-
ment ratee 
No. of 
obs. 
Women born in non-Western countries      
1 D5 E13 A<35 0.542 0.385 0.331 0.225 0.526 4,144 
2 D5 E13 A35 0.589 0.423 0.317 0.203 0.493 3,253 
3 D5 E>13 A<35 0.798 0.645 0.197 0.077 0.269 2,319 
4 D5 E>13 A35 0.828 0.672 0.193 0.067 0.253 1,601 
5 5<D10 E13 A<35 0.639 0.496 0.244 0.145 0.387 2,902 
6 5<D10 E13 A35 0.702 0.561 0.218 0.114 0.331 3,088 
7 5<D10 E>13 A<35 0.828 0.709 0.147 0.050 0.196 1,149 
8 5<D10 E>13 A35 0.859 0.746 0.133 0.039 0.171 1,729 
9 D>10 E13 A<40 0.773 0.680 0.126 0.054 0.187 6,127 
10 D>10 E13 A40 0.794 0.709 0.113 0.046 0.164 8,479 
11 D>10 E>13 A<40 0.883 0.823 0.068 0.016 0.086 2,491 
12 D>10 E>13 A40 0.906 0.854 0.058 0.011 0.070 4,117 
All    0.753 0.642 0.172 0.086 0.254 41,399 
          
Women born in Norway       
13  E13 A<35 0.868 0.812 0.067 0.067 0.135 61,910 
14  E13 A35 0.919 0.893 0.029 0.019 0.049 279,315 
15  E>13 A<35 0.950 0.923 0.028 0.012 0.041 60,557 
16  E>13 A35 0.964 0.952 0.012 0.004 0.017 153,427 
All    0.929 0.904 0.028 0.020 0.049 555,209 
a Participation rate: ( ).P q  b Employment rate: ( ) .P q q   c Unemployment rate: 1– .q   d DW effect: ( ).D q  eModified 
unemployment rate: ( (1) ( ) ) / (1).P P q q P   
 
 As mentioned above, we use the modified unemployment rate to measure the total effect 
of barriers to employment. This rate is highest among immigrant women with short duration of 
residence in Norway and low education (groups 1 and 2). For these two groups, which differ with 
respect to age, the modified unemployment rate is as high as about 50 percent. At the other end of the 
scale, we find well-educated immigrant women who have lived for a long period of time in Norway 
(groups 11 and 12). For these two groups, the modified unemployment rates are about 9 and 7 percent 
respectively, mirroring a low level of discouraged workers. Among immigrant women with short 
duration of residence in Norway and low education, barriers are thus substantial. However, as duration 
of residence increases, immigrant women seem to integrate into the Norwegian labor market. Barriers 
then decrease and employment among immigrant women increases.  
For Norwegian-born women the barriers are typically much smaller, but not always. By 
comparing the figures for the four groups in Table 4 (groups 13 ̶ 16), we note that the modified 
unemployment rate is highest for young women born in Norway with a low level of schooling (group 
13). For this group the modified unemployment rate is about 14 percent. For the other three groups, 
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barriers are much smaller, and the low rates are due to both a low unemployment rate and a low 
discouraged worker effect.   
Above we have discussed the distribution of the discouraged worker effect in the labor market 
for the target population. By dividing the population into a number of groups, we found that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the barriers due to the composition of the different groups. We now wish 
to take a closer look at the difference in behavior for given population groups facing hypothetical 
levels of real wage rates and unemployment rates (1 ).q  As regard wage rates, the distribution of the 
stochastic error term in the wage equation is assumed to be the same as that estimated from the data. 
Specifically, we simulate the labor market behavior of the respective groups of women with given age, 
a given log (real) wage rate, real non-labor income, number of children in the three different age 
groups and hypothetical unemployment rate. The upper part of Table 5 contains simulations for 14 
different types of immigrant women, while the lower part contains similar results for 19 groups of 
women born in Norway. For the latter we present simulations for women with characteristics that are 
not only representative for women born in Norway (cases 15  ̶25), but also similar to the ones used for 
immigrant women (cases 26 ̶ 33). In order to reduce the number of simulations, we consider only 
women with real non-labor income equal to 380,000 NOK (at 2010 prices) for immigrant women and 
490 000 NOK for women born in Norway. These values correspond to the median values in our 
samples used in the estimation of the model. Since the two groups of women also vary systematically 
with respect to wage rate and the probability of obtaining an acceptable job, the assumptions being 
made about the level of these variables also differ across the two groups. The lowest values of the 
mean wage rates correspond (approximately) to the first decile in the distribution of that variable in 
our sample for 2010, whereas the highest value is the ninth decile, and the value in the middle is the 
median value. 
Looking at the results in Table 5 for women born in non-Western countries, we see that the 
discouraged worker effect varies from 0.001 to 0.185. The lowest rate is found for a childless woman 
aged 30 years with a predicted wage equal to 350 NOK and a probability of obtaining an acceptable 
job equal to 0.95, which corresponds to an unemployment rate of 5 percent. The highest rate is for a 
woman aged 45 with a wage equal to 100 NOK (at 2010 prices), with five children, where four of the 
children are in the oldest age group and the last child is in the next oldest age group, and a probability 
of obtaining an acceptable job equal to 0.75. As expected, the discouraged worker effect increases 
when there is an increase in the unemployment rate. By comparing the simulation results for 
immigrant women with different wage rates, we also notice that the discouraged worker effect 
depends on the wage rate. For women with high wage rates, the effect is small (cases 8 and 9), even 
when the unemployment rate is moderate, and the woman has many children (case 9). For women with 
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low wage rates, the effect is considerably higher, even when the unemployment rate is moderate (cases 
6 and 14).  
The relationship between the number of children and the discouraged worker effect is more 
complicated, since a change in the number of children yields shifts in preferences and participation 
rates in the labor market. For young women with medium wage rates in Table 5 (cases 1–4), we note 
that more children increase the discouraged worker effect. However, by comparing the discouraged 
worker effect for cases 12 and 13 we note that there is a slight decrease for women with several chil-
dren. Both these groups face low mean wage rates and belong to the oldest age group. Thus, we would 
expect them to have low participation rates. The participation rates are 0.488 for women with only two 
children and 0.267 for women with five children, according to the results in Table 5.  
Compared to immigrant women, there is much less variation in the discouraged worker effect 
among women born in Norway. For these women (cases 15 ̶ 25), the discouraged worker effect lies 
between 0 and 0.113, and it is only for middle-aged women with a low wage rate, a low q and five 
children (case 23) that the discouraged worker effect is higher than 0.077. 
In the final part of Table 5 we present some simulations for women born in Norway, but with 
mean wage rates and unemployment rates that are more representative for immigrant women. Cases 
26 ̶ 28 relate to young women born in Norway with a mean wage rate equal to the median wage rate 
for immigrant women and varying the hypothetical unemployment rates. While these women are 
childless, others have one young child (cases 29 ̶ 31) or a child in each age group (cases 32 and 33). 
By comparing women with similar characteristics – cases 26, 27, 32 and 33 for women born in 
Norway and cases 1 ̶ 4 for 
immigrant women – we find that the discouraged worker effect is lower among immigrant women 
than 
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Table 5. Predicted fraction of labor force participation and discouraged worker effect by age, 
wage rate, number of children and unemployment ratea 
 
 Real  No. of children aged Unempl. Participation Discour. Modified 
Case wage rateb Age 0–3 4–6 7-18 rate probability worker eff.c unempl. rated 
Immigrant women       
 
1 180 30 0 0 0 0.25 0.933 0.034 0.277 
2 180 30 0 0 0 0.15 0.952 0.015 0.163 
3 180 30 1 1 1 0.25 0.764 0.109 0.344 
4 180 30 1 1 1 0.15 0.822 0.051 0.200 
5 100 30 1 0 0 0.25 0.486 0.183 0.455 
6 100 30 1 0 0 0.15 0.574 0.094 0.269 
7 100 30 1 1 1 0.25 0.356 0.185 0.506 
8 350 30 0 0 0 0.05 0.995 0.001 0.051 
9 350 30 1 1 1 0.15 0.972 0.009 0.158 
10 180 45 0 1 1 0.15 0.889 0.034 0.181 
11 180 45 0 1 4 0.15 0.753 0.067 0.219 
12 100 45 0 1 1 0.25 0.488 0.182 0.454 
13 100 45 0 1 4 0.25 0.267 0.17 0.542 
14 100 45 0 1 4 0.15 0.342 0.095 0.335 
Women born in Norway       
15 205 30 0 0 0 0.025 0.993 0.002 0.027 
16 205 30 1 1 1 0.025 0.958 0.009 0.034 
17 140 30 0 0 0 0.05 0.954 0.018 0.068 
18 140 30 1 1 1 0.05 0.777 0.077 0.135 
19 305 30 0 0 0 0.025 0.999 0 0.025 
20 305 30 1 0 0 0.025 0.997 0.001 0.026 
21 305 30 1 1 1 0.025 0.992 0.002 0.027 
22 140 45 0 1 1 0.05 0.802 0.069 0.126 
23 140 45 0 1 4 0.05 0.611 0.113 0.199 
24 205 45 0 1 1 0.05 0.953 0.018 0.068 
25 205 45 0 1 4 0.05 0.888 0.042 0.093 
Women born in Norway with immigrants’ characteristics    
26 180 30 0 0 0 0.25 0.812 0.179 0.386 
27 180 30 0 0 0 0.15 0.952 0.039 0.183 
28 180 30 0 0 0 0.05 0.985 0.006 0.056 
29 180 30 1 0 0 0.25 0.651 0.329 0.502 
30 180 30 1 0 0 0.15 0.896 0.084 0.223 
31 180 30 1 0 0 0.05 0.967 0.013 0.063 
32 180 30 1 1 1 0.25 0.422 0.528 0.667 
33 180 30 1 1 1 0.15 0.772 0.178 0.310 
a We also assume that non-labor income, measured in 2010 prices, is 380,000 NOK for immigrant women (cases 1 ̶ 14, 26  ̶
33) and 490,000 NOK for women born in Norway (cases 15 ̶ 25). b In constant 2010 NOK prices. c DW effect: D(q). d 
Modified unemployment rate: ( (1) ( ) ) / (1).P P q q P   
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among women born in Norway. Table 5 also shows that the discouraged worker effect among women 
born in Norway with immigrant characteristics is quite sensitive to the level of the unemployment rate 
(equivalent to the probability of getting an acceptable job given search), in particular when the unem-
ployment rate increases from 15 to 25 percent and there are several children in the family.            
8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have analyzed labor force participation and the discouraged worker phenomenon for 
married and cohabitating women born in non-Western countries and Norway, respectively. We have 
demonstrated that our empirical model is consistent with a search-theoretic framework based on 
aggregate rational expectations. The model is estimated separately for immigrant women from non-
Western countries and women born in Norway. According to our estimation results, the two groups 
differ with respect to the estimate of the search costs per unit of time. Women born in Norway have 
higher probabilities of getting acceptable job offers, but they also have considerably higher estimated 
search costs per unit of time compared to immigrant women. A likely explanation for the latter feature 
is that the environments immigrant women are used to are much more demanding than the Norwegian 
one, so they may be accustomed to using more effort in order to achieve results. In total, however, the 
proportion of discouraged workers is significantly higher for some groups of immigrant women than 
for women born in Norway. The reason is that the probabilities of getting an acceptable job are 
substantially lower for immigrant women compared to women born in Norway and immigrant women 
will therefore, on average, need to search for a longer time than women born in Norway in order to get 
an acceptable job.  
Not surprisingly, we find that educational qualifications are a key variable for the size of the 
discouraged worker effect for both married/cohabiting women born in non-Western countries and 
women born in Norway. A higher level of education is associated with both an increase in the wage 
rate the woman might expect to get in the labor market and her probability of getting a job offer she 
considers acceptable. Both these effects tend to reduce barriers in the labor market as measured by the 
discouraged worker effect and the modified unemployment rate, and years of schooling then influence 
barriers in the labor market positively through two channels.  
Among immigrant women, duration of residence has a similar effect on barriers to 
employment as educational qualifications, as it is positively correlated with the wage rate and the 
probability of getting an acceptable job offer. 
Although the analysis of this paper has focused on data from Norway we believe that our 
results also are of interest to other countries. First, we have demonstrated that a simple empirical 
model for labor force participation as a function of the probability of obtaining an acceptable job (1-
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unemployment rate), wage rate and other covariates is consistent with the notion of aggregate rational 
search behavior. Second, provided data on labor force participation, unemployment, wages, incomes 
and suitable covariates are available for several cross-sections this model can be estimated, and 
subsequently be applied to predict the level of modified unemployment in counterfactual settings. As 
mentioned in the introduction, several countries (such as the US) collect data on discouraged workers. 
Such data are evidently useful for descriptive purposes. Still, we believe it is of interest to conduct a 
structural analysis that intends to explain how labor force participation varies over the cycle and 
depends on key socio-economic variables, such as the expected cost of search, the individual wage 
rate, and which can be used to analyze counterfactuals. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
From well-known results (Yellott, 1977), it follows that Assumption 4 is satisfied provided the error 
terms 0 1 2, ,    are independent and distributed according to the Gumbel distribution. Since 0  and 
2  are independent it must also be the case that 1  is independent of 0  and 2.  Note that j  are 
standard Gumbel distributed with c.d.f. exp (-exp(-x)). Also, from well-known properties of the 
Gumbel distribution, it follows that 
      1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2( , ) | ) (max( ) | ) log(exp( ) exp( ))
p pE U U Z E u , u Z Z u u + Z                 
(A.1)      
which together with (3.5) yields 
  1 1 2 2log(exp( ) exp( )) .
c
u u u Z

   

               (A.2) 
Furthermore, (A.2) implies that  
  1 2 2exp( )(exp( / ) 1) exp( )u c u Z         
which yields the result of the theorem. 
                   Q.E.D.  
Proof of Corollary 1: 
Recall that     
2 1 2 2 2 1 1( ) ( )q P U U P u Z u               
       
1 2 2
(1 exp( / ))
1 exp( )
c
u u Z

  
  
   
  
 
which yields 
       
/
.
1 exp( / )
c c
q c
  
 

 
              (A.3) 
From (A.3) we note that there is a unique correspondence between /c   and /c q.  We can thus 
write the equation in Corollary 1 as 
  log(exp( / ) 1) ( / )c h c q                    (A.4)
  
for some suitable function h. The relation in (A.4) implies that 
  / log(1 exp( ( / )).c h c q                (A.5) 
When (A.5) is inserted into (3.6) we obtain that ( ( / )) /g h c c q    where 
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  ( ) (1 exp( ))log(1 exp( )).g h h h      
The function g is strictly increasing and strictly convex. To realize this, note that  
  ( ) [exp( ) log(1 exp( ))]exp( ).g h h h h       
Since the derivative of exp( ) log(1 exp( ))h h  is positive for all h it follows that ( ) 0g h   for all h. 
Therefore, the equation ( ( ))g h x x defines the function ( )h x uniquely. Moreover, since 
( ( )) ( ) 1g h x h x    it follows that h is strictly increasing. From (6) and (A.5) we therefore obtain that 
1 2 2 ( / ).t t tu u Z h c        Furthermore, it is easy to show that ( ) 0g x   which together with 
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0g h x h x g h x h x      implies that ( ) 0.h x    
                  Q.E.D.  
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Appendix B 
Distributional properties of ratios of independent stable random variables 
Lemma 1 
 Assume that , 1,2,jV j   are independent stable random variables that are distributed as 
(1,1,0)S  with 1,   and let  1 2log .Z V V
16 Then the p.d.f. of Z is given by 
   
 
 
sin
( )
2cos( )z z
f z
e e


  

 
. 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Since , 1,2,jV j   are independent with c.d.f. (1,1,0)S  it follows that the event 
1Z z   is 
equivalent to 
   1 2( ) 0,
( )
zV e V
U z
z

   
where ( )z  is the scale parameter of the stable random variable ( )U z . From Property 1.2.1 in 
Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994, p. 10), it follows that the scale and the skewness parameters of 
( )U z  are one and ( )z  respectively, where the latter is given by 
   
1
( ) .
1
z
z
e
z
e






 
From Zolotarev (1986, equation (2.2.30), p. 79), it follows that  
   
 
1
11 1
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   (B.1) 
where tan( / 2).    From (B.1) it follows that the probability density of 1Z   is given by 
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 (B.2) 
But (B.2) means that the p.d.f. of Z is given by 
                                                     
16 The notation ( , , )S     means a stable distribution with index ,  scale parameter ,  skewness parameter   and 
location parameter .    
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 Q.E.D. 
 Lemma 2 
Assume that Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Then 2 0Z Z  has p.d.f. ( )f z  defined on ( , )   
that is given by 
   
1 sin( )
( )
2cos( )z z
f z
e e
  

 
 
 
 
where   is a parameter, 0 1,   that is related to the variance of 2 0Z Z  by   
    
2
2
2 0( ) 1 .
3
Var Z Z

      
Furthermore, the participation probability is given by 
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Proof of Lemma 2: 
Consider a setting of binary choice with utilities 1 0 1V Z    and 2 2 2V Z v     where 1  and 2  
are independent standard Gumbel-distributed random variables that are independent of the random 
variables 0Z  and 2.Z  Furthermore, 0Z  and 2Z are independent. It follows by known results that  
     2 1 0 2
2 0
1
( | , )
1 exp( )
P V V Z Z
v Z Z
 
   
. 
By Assumption 4 it follows that 
  2 1
1
( ) .
1 exp( )
P V V
v
 

 
 
 
But for this to be true it follows from Yellott (1977) that 0 1Z   and 2 2Z   must also be 
standard Gumbel-distributed. Since 0.5772( ) exp( ),yjP y e
    j = 1, 2, and   
                   
     2
0.5772 /1
2 2 2 2 2( ) ( | ) exp( )
Z ypP Z y EP y Z Z E e               
it follows that we must have  
  2
0.5772 / 0.5772exp( ) exp( ).
Z y yE e e             (B.3) 
Let 
10.5772 yw e 
 , which yields that 0.5772 0.5772(1 ).ye w e    When inserting for 2Z  in (B.3) we get 
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  2
0.5772(1 )exp( ) exp( )
ZE we w e             (B.4) 
for 0.w  We recognize the left-hand side of (B.4) as the Laplace transform of the distribution of 
2exp( ).Z  From Proposition 1.2.12 in Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994, p. 15), it then follows that 
2exp( )Z  must be an   stable random variable that is maximally skew to the right with location 
parameter equal to zero. It also follows that the scale parameter   is given, implicitly, by 
10.5772(1 ) cos( / 2).e  
  This last equation implies that cos( / 2)  is non-negative, which can 
only be the case if 1.   Thus, we have proved that there exist independent random variables such 
that Assumption 5 is possible. From Lemma 1 we therefore obtain that 2 0Z Z  must have p.d.f. given 
by    
1 sin( )
.
2cos( )z ze e 

 

 
 
In order to prove the variance formula, we use the fact that 
2
1 0 1( ) 2 / 3.Var Var       Since  
1 0 2 0Z Z     has the same distribution as 1 0   it follows that  
2 2
1 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iVar Z Z Var Var Z Z Var                   
from which the variance formula follows. 
           Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C  
Estimation results for the wage equations 
Table C1 displays the estimation results for the wage equations. Most of the variables enter the real 
wage equations in a significant manner. The estimated return on education is somewhat larger for 
women born in Norway than for women born in non-Western countries. In both equations experience 
has a positive effect on the real wage, but it is not easy to compare the results for the two groups since 
for immigrant women experience and duration of residence to some extent pick up similar features. 
The dummy for urbanity enters, as expected, with a positive and significant value. For both groups the 
estimated time effects are all positive and increase over time, accounting for business cycle variations 
and general growth of real wages over time which is not due to changes in the other explanatory 
variables.  
Table C1. Estimates of wage equations  
Variables Women born in non-Western 
countries 
Women born in Norway 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Constant 4.083 53.67 4.110 445.94 
Education 0.036 11.06 0.042 86.15 
Experience 0.013 2.74 0.018 36.68 
Experience squared/100 –0.018 –1.68 –0.028 –27.61 
Dummy for urbanity   0.031 12.45 
Duration of residence/10 0.107 2.89   
Duration of residence squared/100 –0.013 –1.22   
D91T93a 0.051 1.16 0.063 18.71 
D94T96 0.095 2.10 0.087 24.20 
D97T99 0.137 2.90 0.116 28.94 
D00T02 0.177 3.80 0.164 39.04 
D03T05 0.201 4.51 0.218 50.70 
D06T08 0.274 6.38 0.291 66.36 
D09T10 0.341 7.68 0.373 69.52 
Variance of random effect 0.118  0.222 
Variance of genuine error term 0.088  0.204 
No. of observatiobs 2,768  98,544 
Log-likelihood –1,545.2  –14,439.1 
a The variable D9193 is a dummy for the years 1991–1993, with a similar notation for the other time dummies. The dummy 
D8890 is excluded since a constant term is present. 
39 
Estimation results for probability of obtaining a job conditional on search 
Table C2 shows the results from the estimation of the q-relations (probability of getting an acceptable 
job offer given search). As is evident from the estimation results in Table C2, model specifications are 
somewhat different with respect to explanatory variables. Work experience is included only in the 
specification for women born in Norway, while this variable is replaced by duration of residence for 
immigrant women. For both groups the sets of explanatory variables are expanded by including the log 
of the real non-labor income and the number of children aged 0–3 years and 4–6 years, respectively. 
The education variable is significant in both relations, but the estimate of the coefficient 
attached to education in the equations for women born in non-Western countries is only a third of the 
corresponding estimate for women born in Norway. Thus, education is more important for job 
probability for women born in Norway than for women born in non-Western countries. For women 
born in Norway only the estimate of the coefficient attached to the linear term of experience is 
significant. As expected, experience has a positive effect on the job probability. Both the linear and the 
quadratic terms of the duration of residence impact the job probability significantly. The estimate of 
the coefficient attached to the linear term is positive whereas the estimate of the coefficient of the 
quadratic term is negative. The log of real non-labor income enters both relations positively, but the 
size of the estimated coefficient attached to this variable is somewhat larger for immigrant women. 
Both the variables on the number of children in two age groups enter with a negative effect on the job 
probability, and they are mostly significant at the 5 percent level. For both groups the estimated effect 
of the variable indicating the number of children aged 4–6 years is somewhat larger than for the 
number of children aged 0–3 years. The time dummies enter significantly for both groups and show a 
variation over time that mirrors business cycle variation.        
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Table C2. Estimates of the job offer probability, q     
Variables Women born in non-Western 
countries 
Women born in Norway 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Education 0.081 5.494 0.243 26.175 
Work experience   0.060 6.344 
Work experience squared/100   –0.017 –0.891 
Duration of residence/10 1.201 5.978   
Duration of residence squared/100 –0.179 –2.801   
Log (real non-labor income) 0.260 3.691 0.154 4.906 
No. of children aged 0–3 –0.166 –1.829 –0.140 –3.599 
No. of children aged 4–6 –0.388 –3.978        –0.211 –5.350 
D88T90a –2.349 –2.615 –2.257 –5.556 
D91T93 –3.391 –3.960 –2.422 –5.955 
D94T96 –3.452 –4.019 –2.412 –5.904 
D97T99 –3.061 –3.481 –2.327 –5.627 
D00T02 –3.097 –3.480 –2.409 –5.772 
D03T05 –3.303 –3.741 –2.654 –6.316 
D06T08 –2.837 –3.178 –2.179 –5.101 
D09T10 –2.837 –3.157 –2.019 –5.566 
No. of observations 3,459  107,444 
McFadden’s 
2   0.48  0.82 
a The variable D9193 is a dummy for the years 1991–1993, with a similar notation for the other time dummies.  
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Appendix D 
Generating independent draws from the p.d.f. given in Eq. (9) 
Let 
irX , r = 1, 2, …, M, be normally distributed N(0,1) and let ( )x  denote the standard normal 
c.d.f. Let ( )bg z  be the p.d.f.  
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b e e b
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    (D.1) 
where b is a positive scalar. Define the random variable  
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    (D.2) 
for r = 1, 2,…,M, for individual i. The variable ( )irA b  will then be distributed according to (D.1). 
Thus, one can simulate random variables from g(y) by first draw independent standard normally 
distributed random variables and subsequently use (D.2) to calculate these random variables. Note 
next that ( ) /irA    has p.d.f. ( )f z  given in (9). Hence, we can write 
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it i
i t it i t ir
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
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.    (D.3) 
The simulation procedure goes as follows. Let, for example, 0 0.5b    be the starting value. Given 
this value of b, one can generate 0( )irA   by using (D.2). Then, by plugging the formula in (D.3) into 
the likelihood function with 0( ),ir irA A   one can obtain a new estimate of , 1.   Use this new 
value of α to generate 1( ).irA   Then the procedure is repeated until convergence is obtained. 
 
 
 
